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conformity with the forecast in question would, on the whole, have been
a step in the right direction or in the wrong one." 16Predictionswere
assumed to apply to no more than eight months into the future unless
the forecaster indicated otherwise. A forecast of conditions in a special
sector was judged only by events in that sector. Forecasts of general
business were checked either against the composite index of business
activity specified by the service or, failing that, against three composite
indexes (those of the Annalist, A.T.&T., and the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York).
The relation of Cox's scores to recognition of cyclical turning points
is not clear. The scores during the six months before and after a cyclical
peak or trough may or may not pertain to forecasts of the turning points
in question. Nevertheless, Chart 1-3 is presented to supplement Chart
1-2. It displays some tendency toward increasing correctness of fore-
casts as turns are approached and passed, but the tendency isless
marked for the averages than in Chart 1-2. For 1929, the scores fluctu-
ate from month to month in a highly erratic fashion.
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1948—61. Accuracy of Dating
For each of the eight turning points between 1948 and 1961, we have
studied reports published by a number of contemporary observers. Like
Cox, we first excerpted short quotations from current forecasts. We
scored the excerpts in two different ways, for accuracy of dating and
for degree of recognition. The scores for dating range from 0 to 100.
The maximum score was given for designating a peak or trough within
one month of the NBER date. A forecast that missed by two months
received a score of 75; by three months, 50; by four months, 25. Thus,
positive scores were given for forecasts of a peak or trough anywhere
within a nine-month interval centered on the NBER reference date. A
16Ibid., p. 19.14 Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts
score of zero means either a forecast that missed by more than four
months or, much more frequently, no forecast of dating. Errors in dating
a turn too early were scored the same as dating them too late. From
the point of view of forecasting, and also for policy-making, the latter
are more serious.
As just described, the scoring system for dating might appear to be
objective, but in practice it involved much subjective judgment. Most
of the analysts studied gave little explicit attention to determining the
date of the peak or trough.'7 As a result the scores were often based on
a chance statement that might or might not be inferred to forecast the
date of the turn. Close questions sometimes arose as to whether a fore-
cast should be given 0 or some positive score (often 100), 0 being given
if the analyst was deemed to have made no forecast of dating, a positive
score if an oblique statement could be inferred to have forecast a turn
within the nine-month target period. If a publication predicted the date
of a peak or trough in one issue but neither revised nor repeated it in
the next, we assumed that the forecast of dating remained the same
and gave the new forecast the same score as the old. This procedure
meant that a close decision on a chance statement sometimes made a
large difference to the total score of a given analyst.18
ii Evidence of lack of interest in dating is afforded by the high proportion of
scores based on no forecast at all—63 per cent. (As noted above, a publication
making no forecast normally received a score of zero, but, as noted below, a
publication that received a positive score one month but said nothing thereafter
was given the same positive score every month until six months after the peak
or trough.)
18 The analysts were first scored by the author and C. Elton Hinshaw inde-
pendently. Where differences could not be resolved by discussion, the final decision
was made by the author. Predictions about timing seldom designated a specific
month band sometimes were quite vague. Such indefiniteness was penalized. The
penalty consisted of a deduction of 12½ for each month by which the period in
which the turn was predicted to occur exceeded three months. Under this system,
a forecast of a peak in the first half of 1960 would receive a score of 50. The
NBER reference date is May. The midpoint of the first half-year is March 31—
April 1, just outside the target period of April-May-June, and would be scored
87½ minus a penalty of 37½ for indefiniteness. A forecast of a peak in the
three-month period March-April-May, on the other hand, would get a score of
100. The midpoint of the forecast period falls within the three-month target
period, and no penalty would be assessed for indefiniteness. If the forecast was
vague about when the turn was expected, the predicted timing was inferred as
well as possible, and then a penalty was assessed for the vagueness. The decision
to adopt an explicit scoring system was made after the quotations had been
excerpted from the publications. A spot check has shown that the quotations were
not always the best possible for purposes of scoring. We did not have excerpts
from every issue of the weekly publications. The missing weeks were treated in1948—61: Accuracy of Dating 15
Eight of the publications studied are available monthly (or weekly)
for all eight turns between 1948 and 1961. Averages for these eight
constitute the core of our study. They include four business publications,
two security services, and two bank letters. In terms of circulation and
influence, they constitute an elite group. Three of the business publica-
tions are the best known names in the field. The two leading security
services are represented, and the bank letters come from large, highly
respected institutions. Two publications that relied principally on the
business cycle indicators developed by the NBER were also scored.'°
Since their records did not cover the entire eight turns, averages includ-
ing them are shown separately.
Panel A of Chart 1-4 summarizes the results. The monthly averages
for eight analysts for four troughs and (to a lesser extent) for four peaks
show the expected upward drift. Three months before the turn the
averages are very low (so low that there seemed little point in scoring
earlier months). The scores for accuracy of dating are much higher at
troughs than at peaks. The average of the 320 scores at the four peaks
(eight forecasters, ten months per peak) is only 10 compared with 37'/2
fortroughs. The average for the sixth month after peaks is only 23
compared with 71 for the sixth month after troughs. Of 360 scores as-
sociated with peaks for all ten publications, 303 are zero (84 per cent).
At troughs, there are only 142 zero scores out of 370 (38 per cent).
That is, there were four times as many nonzero scores at troughs as at
peaks (228 vs. 57).
The scores in Panel A of Chart 1-4 probably understate the ability
of the eight publications to forecast dating. For all ten publications, only
37 per cent of the scores are based on actual forecasts. In 50 per cent
of the cases, a zero score was assigned because no forecast of the date
the same manner as cases where the publication said nothing about timing, that
is, the previous score was carried forward. The weekly scores were then averaged
to get the monthly scores. The forecasts of one monthly publication were regarded
as having been made in the month preceding the date of publication, since it
regularly appears toward the end of the preceding month. Otherwise no effort
was made to allow for the fact that the forecasts of different publications were
made at different times during the month.
19Itis the policy of the National Bureau of Economic Research not to identify
the sources of forecasts evaluated in the large research project of which this
study is a part. The policy applies to forecasts that have been published as well
as unpublished forecasts given to the NBER on a confidential basis. The reasons
for this policy are given by Zarnowitz in An Appraisal of Short-Term Economic
Forecasts, pp. 1—2.16 RecognitionPatternsof BusinessAnalysts
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of the turn had been made. (In 10 per cent of the cases, a score of zero
was given because the forecast of the date was poor.) The remaining
13 per cent of the scores are positive scores carried forward from an
earlier month. These figures, as indicated, include the two publications
not available for all turns. These two made forecasts of dating more
frequently than the others. For the eight alone, only 33 per cent of the
scores are based on actual forecasts.
Panel B of Chart 1-4 shows the results of excluding from the averages
all of the zero scores based on no forecasts and a majority of the positive
scores based on no forecasts. In a few cases, a positive score was re—
tamed because the publication clearly had no reason to repeat a conclu-
sion already reached. Many of these cases occurred in 1961, when most
forecasters knew within a few months that the trough had occurred in
February, lost interest in the matter, and went on to discuss how vigor-
ous the upswing would be. Positive scores not based on an actual fore-
cast were retained only if three conditions were met: (1) the score was
for a date no earlier than the second month after the NBER peak or
trough; (2) the date given was not subsequently revised by the publica-
tion during the scoring period (i.e., within six months of the turn); (3)
the accompanying certainty score (see the next chapter) was at least 75.
If these three conditions were not met, failure to repeat an earlier fore-
cast might have resulted from a change of opinion.
Since most of the scores thus excluded were zeros, the patterns in
Panel B are higher than those in Panel A. The scores continue to be
higher at troughs than at peaks. Panel B presumably overstates the
ability of the eight publications to forecast the dates of turns, since failure
to forecast a date can result from inability to do so. A fair assessment
of forecasting ability probably lies somewhere between the patterns of
the two panels. The data going into Panel A, however, have the ad-
vantage of greater comparability: for every month of every scoring
period there are eight observations. The data for Panel B include a
number of observations for each month varying from zero to eight.2°
20Thevariation in number of observations means that a choice had to be
made between two weighting systems in calculating the averages shown in Chart
1-4, Panel B (the data for these can be found in Appendix I, Table B). Giving
equal weight to each published forecast gives an upward bias, since more analysts
give forecasts of dating in easy cases like 1961 (when only 8 per cent of the
scores were excluded under our rules) than at turns hard to forecast like 1948
(when 89 per cent of the scores had to be dropped). The alternative of weighting
each month equally regardless of the number of scores entering into that month's18 Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts
For the sake of comparability, the dating scores discussed in the re-
mainder of this paper include all scores whether based on forecasts or
not.
There was a wide variation among the scores for individual analysts.
For each analyst all the scores for the full ten-month period and for all
eight turns were averaged. The averages ranged from 16 to 52. The
median of the average scores of the eight analysts was 23, the mean
26. Panel C of Chart 1-4 contrasts the patterns of the "best" and "worst"
analysts. It also shows the average pattern for 1957—61 for the two
publications that relied heavily on business cycle indicators.
A word of caution isin order about the "best" and the "worst"
forecaster in Chart 1-4, in other charts in my study, and in Hinshaw's
comparison of the "best" with the Federal Open Market Committee.
The "worst" analyst is the one with the lowest average score for degree
of certainty (see the next chapter) but is only the second lowest with
respect to accuracy of dating. The "best" analyst has the highest average
score for both accuracy of dating and degree of certainty, taking peaks
and troughs together. It has the highest scores, moreover, for peaks
alone with respect to dating and for troughs alone with respect to both
dating and certainty, but not for peaks alone with respect to certainty.
In fact, its certainty scores at peaks were erratic—it had the highest
score at one peak, the fourth highest at another peak, and the seventh
highest (i.e., second worst) at the other two.21 As a result, the so-called
"best" displayed the greatest variability in certainty scores of the eight
forecasters, even when all peaks and troughs are taken together. Since
consistency is a virtue in forecasting, these considerations throw serious
doubt as to whether the "best" can be considered a superior forecaster.
Even its superiority with respect to dating is open to question on grounds
that its higher scores resulted from the others ignoring the question of
determining the date of the peak or trough. Of course, the range (or
the uppermost observation) is in any event of limited value, since the
range depends on the size of the sample. The best in a sample of eight is
likely to be inferior to the best in a sample of eighty but superior to the
best in a sample of four.
average (unless the number was zero) was therefore used instead. (A chart com-
paring the two procedures shows that the results are closely similar at troughs.
At peaks the expected bias is evident but not great.)
21 See Appendix I, Table J.